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Most of us have taught what we thought to be a pretty good lesson sequence and then been 
disappointed with how little our students seem to have learned. Or perhaps the lessons did 
not feel quite right but we struggled to identify why or what to do about it. Such experiences 
throw up a number of questions with which the history education community has grappled 
for many decades: How does knowing facts relate to understanding the import of those facts 
in answering history’s ‘what’, ‘how’, and ‘why’ shaped questions? Are there different types of 
knowledge in history and, if so, how do they interact and develop? 
One such knowledge-type distinction, common in the British history education community 
and influential internationally, is between substantive historical knowledge (knowledge of 
what happened in the past) and second-order knowledge (the conceptual and procedural 
knowledge that make the study of the past possible).1  This distinction gives history teachers 
important ways of thinking about variance in their students’ achievements, but my focus 
in this article is on the difficulties experienced by students who appear to hold relevant 
knowledge about the past but cannot deploy it effectively. Such difficulties can be seen, for 
example, when exam candidates deliver a narrow recitation of substantive information that 
is related to, but not responsive to what was actually asked.2 
I faced this problem as I re-worked a short sequence of causal reasoning lessons through 
which I wanted my Year 10 students to learn to explain Hitler’s rise to the Chancellorship. 
The sequence was informed by the standard exam question, ‘Was the economic crisis the 
main reason Hitler became Chancellor?’3 In sharing this example I offer tentative ideas about 
what we might mean when we claim that students have historical knowledge. My interest is 
not in any particular type of knowledge, nor am I making claims about the importance of one 
type over another; I am seeking to delve a little deeper into what kind of thing knowledge 
actually is.4  A clearer appreciation of the nature of knowledge itself might shed light on why 
students vary in terms of the types and sophistication of the knowledge that they develop 
and offer implications and teaching strategies worthy of classroom experimentation.
the original lesson sequence: finding students’ 
starting points
My initial sequence centred around a three-circle Venn diagram card-sort, illustrated in 
Figures 1 and 2, in which students became familiar with relevant substantive knowledge 
about Germany in the 1920s/early 1930s and which imposed a causal structure on the mass 
of detail by using three analytical categories: economic, political and ‘Hitler’.5 Most of the 
essays written as a result included three well-informed paragraphs, rich in substantive detail 
and each with a good basic structure, but my students could not use their experience of the 
card-sort to explain how the factors combined and eventually culminated in Hitler becoming 
Chancellor, nor could they make a case for the relative importance of each of these factors.6 
In response to the weaknesses in my students’ essays I could have revised the sequence in a 
number of ways; for example, by creating more alluring activities, offering more foolproof 
writing structures or providing ever more explicit success criteria, all of which have their 
place.7  The potential success of any revision, however, rests on the teacher’s diagnosis of the 
problem, on their vision of what is possible and desirable, and on their ingenuity in creating 
learning experiences capable of addressing the issue identified. 
In my appraisal, there was nothing wrong with my Venn diagram card-sort. The problem 
was that I thought it would suffice. While categorising causes is one essential stepping-stone 
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in explaining Hitler’s rise to the Chancellorship, it is not the 
only, nor even the most important, thinking required.  My 
students neither recognised the point of the question nor 
the analytical process required to answer it. In asking  them 
to write an essay at this point, I had asked them to ‘perform’ 
much too early – it was wasteful writing designed to convey 
understanding they did not yet have, because I had managed 
to circumvent the necessary thinking. I had misjudged the 
students’ starting points and the thinking steps appropriate 
to answering the enquiry question.  
who is doing the thinking and 
what thinking is it?
As I considered what was needed, it became clear that my 
students could not simply locate and lift reasons for Hitler’s 
rise (or for the relative importance of diverse causes) from 
the cards because the cards did not explicitly contain this 
information. I think that is a good thing! My solution was 
not to insert explicit reasons for Hitler’s rise into the cards. 
The task was not intended as a kind of treasure hunt in 
which the students would merely locate arguments ready 
for transcription. The point of asking the question was that 
the students should generate a causal argument, not merely 
remember and (perhaps) make sense of someone else’s 
argument. 
The provenance of the argument that they presented 
mattered. I cared about whose cognitive labour had produced 
this manifestation of knowledge and not simply that the 
knowledge should be made manifest.  The mystery I needed 
to solve was why the students had not generated causal 
arguments, since I had specifically designed the cards to 
contain the details from which such explanation could be 
constructed. It was not that the students did not have the 
right substantive details. It was not even that they did not, 
in some sense, ‘know’ the substantive details. But it was clear 
that these facts somehow lacked meaning for them in relation 
to this question. My activity would have been adequate for 
a student who knew both the details on the cards and the 
implications of those details within an understanding of 
how they think the world works – in this case, how students 
think events in 1930s Germany were and were not caused. 
In what sense can students ‘know’ the details on the cards 
yet not ‘know’ their implications in relation to this historical 
question? 
what does it mean ‘to have 
historical knowledge’?
If an utterance, such as ‘there were many reasons for Hitler 
becoming Chancellor’ or ‘the economic situation was the 
main reason Hitler became Chancellor’, is to have meaning, 
that meaning rests in the underlying reasoning that gave 
rise to and follows from it.8  Students’ underlying reasoning 
can be cut short in two ways; either by students deferring to 
authoritative testimony without scrutiny or by predominantly 
thinking of meaning on a representational level, by which I 
mean that students assume that they understand sentences 
because they can identify the things in the world to which 
the words refer. 
To take each in turn, if the child’s reasoning, and therefore 
the meaning behind their utterance, is limited to ‘because the 
teacher said so’ or ‘the exam board values that kind of thing’ 
or ‘that’s what’s on the cards’ or ‘the smart student said it’, 
then the sense in which they can be said to know it, is quite 
weak. If we think of our words as the expression of a  mental 
undertaking – that reveals how we think the world is and that 
commits us to certain implications – then our statements 
are a kind of obligation.9  If, ‘because the teacher said so’ is 
all that sits behind a student’s claim, that student has obliged 
themselves to the source of knowledge – to the authoritative 
figure – with limited obligation to their thinking about the 
referents of their statements and their implications – in this case, 
the circumstances and events leading up to Hitler becoming 
Chancellor. What underpins the claim is very shallow indeed.
The second sense in which underlying reasoning can 
be cut short requires a little more explanation. Take the 
everyday example of a sentence such as, ‘It is red.’ This same 
sentence might mean quite different things when uttered 
Figure 1: The principles informing my creation of cards for the Venn diagram activity 
The cards that I designed were intended to achieve 
three objectives:
a) to offer a comprehensive but basic overview of 
the relevant information; 
b) to represent all three causal factors that I hoped 
students would identify when sifting information; 
and 
c)  to provide some content within each segment of 
the Venn diagram and thus allow the students to 
generate causal arguments. This meant including 
a number of straightforward cards that obviously 
belonged within a single category, such as cards 
9 and 11; some more challenging statements 
that belonged in the overlapping segments 
between two categories, such as cards 2 and 
13; and some much less obvious statements 
that reflected the overlap between all three 
categories, such as card 5.
Political
‘Hitler’
Economic
Card 9
Card 11
Card 13
Card 5
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Figure 2: The cards used in the Venn diagram activity (Round 1) 
The intrigues that brought Hitler into office rested 
on the fact that conservatives and Nazis shared 
many values and the former believed they could 
control the Nazis.
The Great Depression intensified feelings against 
the Weimar Republic and paved the way for the 
collapse of democracy.
The main element of electoral campaigning was 
the local political meeting. Different things could 
be promised to different people at a time when 
there was not instantaneous national media 
coverage. 
Successive Chancellors from March 1930 to 
January 1933 failed to lead Germany out of 
economic crisis.
Industrial production fell by 42%.
Hitler promised work and bread and to help 
farmers take Germany out of economic crisis and 
turn it into an idyllic rural society.
Nazi Party growth in electoral support from 2.6% 
of the vote (seats) in 1928 to 37.3% of the vote 
(seats) in 1932.
Hitler viewed the use of propaganda as a crucial 
weapon in winning mass support. He believed that 
the public could be fooled into believing anything 
if they heard the message over and over enough 
times, and that most voters ‘will more easily fall 
victim to a great lie than to a small one.’
When the US stock market (called Wall Street) 
crashed in October 1929 the value of shares 
collapsed and many US businesses were ruined. 
Americans, suffering from the economic crisis, 
ended their loans to Germany and demanded the 
repayment of existing loans.
The German Communist Party was the largest in 
Europe outside the Soviet Union. The Communists 
had a lot of support from the working class and 
close links with the Soviet Union.
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10
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13 14
15 16
17 18
19 20
The split between the Social Democrats (SPD) and 
the Communists (KDP) meant that they spent time 
attacking each other rather than uniting against 
the right in the early 1930s. 
Unemployment soared from 1.4 million in 1928 
to 6 million in 1932 (approximately 1 in 3 of the 
labour force).
Diverse groups could unite around general Nazi 
themes: nationalism, hostility to socialism and the 
political mess of the Weimar Republic, as well as 
traditional and family values.
Hindenburg, under the influence of leading 
business and army figures, invited Hitler to become 
Chancellor and form a coalition government in 
January 1933. It was hoped that Hitler could be 
harnessed to serve their needs.
Farming was heavily hit after the Great Depression.
Proportional Representation encouraged weak 
coalition governments as it made it difficult for any 
single party to win a majority and allowed extreme 
parties to have a voice in the Reichstag.
Hitler courted army and business leaders, especially 
in 1932. He held a meeting of big business and 
reassured them they had nothing to fear from the 
Nazis.
By July 1932 the Nazi Party was the largest in 
the Reichstag; by turning the Nazi party into the 
most popular German political party, the voters 
had helped Hitler to use his political skills to put 
pressure on Hindenburg to make him Chancellor.
The Munich Putsch changed Hitler from an 
incompetent street fighter to a shrewd and skilful 
politician. Hitler changed his strategy to gain 
power as a result of his experience of the failed 
Munich Putsch: he would now try to win power 
through elections and then, as leader of Germany, 
destroy democracy with a legal revolution. 
Many German businesses were forced to close. 
They were heavily dependent on loans from the 
USA.
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by different people – by a toddler, for example, or by an 
interior designer. What is the difference in meaning when 
the words remain the same? Arguably, the difference lies in 
the wealth of experience that sits behind them; the wealth of 
experience that the words represent, that they are symbols 
of and stand in for. Even if students can ascribe a dictionary 
definition to each word in the claim – that is, the referent in 
the world thought to correspond to each distinct element; 
for example, the man called Hitler and not another man, or 
the ‘thing’ called an economy and not another thing – the 
real conceptual power of the sentence remains quite weak. 
If pressed, students’ ability to reason with the antecedents and 
consequences of their statement will fizzle out quite quickly 
when the statement rests upon thoughtlessly deferring to 
authority or capping reasoning at the identification level. The 
philosopher Wilfrid Sellars captured this underlying mental 
arena as ‘the space of reasons’.10 It refers to the conceptual 
judgements implied in any claim, even one as simple as ‘It is 
red.’11 We do not commonly think of such simple statements as 
entailing reasoning because it goes unspoken and unnoticed; 
but the importance of conceptual reasoning becomes clear 
when we contrast an  interior designer’s claim ‘it is red’ with 
that of a parrot merely repeating what it has heard that designer 
say. ‘Red’ functions as a concept when it is used to refer to the 
colour of red things and is understood as distinguishing those 
things from others that are green or blue. The development of 
that reasoning can be seen in the way in which a young child 
gradually learns the meaning of the word ‘kitten’ – a process 
that entails multiple and varied encounters with ‘if…then…’ 
reasoning.12 Imagine the child learns the word first while 
looking at a picture book that features as young cat. Later, 
out walking with her father, she encounters a woman in a fur 
coat and announces, ‘Kitten, kitten, kitten’. Her father corrects 
her.  Next, the child strokes her teddy bear, and responds to 
the soft fur by announcing ‘Kitten, kitten, kitten’. Again her 
father corrects her. The child then meets the neighbour’s cat 
– ‘Kitten, kitten, kitten’, she declares, and so on, back to the 
picture book.13 The philosopher Robert Brandom contrasts 
meaning understood as a network of ‘if…then…’ reasoning 
sitting behind language (inferentialism) against meaning 
understood as simply a word-to-world correspondence where 
meaning is just the thing in the world that the word picks out 
(a referential or representational model of meaning).14 
According to inferentialism, learning the name for simple 
concepts such as cats or colours requires reasoning, and by 
implication, multiple encounters, and diverse contexts, as the 
child hones their understanding of what can legitimately be 
ruled in and out by their use of the word ‘kitten’. If we include 
an inferentialist perspective within our understanding 
of knowledge, any and all concepts (substantive, second-
order and procedural concepts) function with a referential 
and an inferential guise. ‘Peasant’, ‘law’, ‘revolution’, ‘cause’, 
‘corroborate’ and ‘substantiate’ each have a short-hand, 
representational meaning – the word-to-world naming 
–  and a background, ‘space of reasons’, the bundling and 
re-bundling of implications of how we take the world to be.15 
Teachers see the gap between words and the speaker or listener’s 
‘space of reasons’ every day; they recognise that the same words 
do not carry the same strength of meaning for every student in 
Figure 3: The benefits of including specific opportunities for students to build up to self-discovered insights
Insights that students have discovered for themselves are likely to have increased longevity and greater applicability 
and versatility in new contexts than ‘given’ insights that are subsequently reasoned through by the student. Students’ 
need to commit to memory a vast range of names, dates and events in history. As far as possible, I wanted to avoid 
adding what ought to be background capacities to this memory load. I wanted to avoid students having to call up a 
remembrance of a fact learned – that when you see ‘x’, a
particular kind of question stem, you do ‘Y’ in response; intending instead that the logic of a sensible answer could 
come from inside them as mental reflex. A memorised ‘rule of thumb’ is perhaps better than having no idea how 
to answer a particular style of question, but why settle for this compromise when many students are capable of so 
much more?
I know with greater assurance that a student has forged the reasoning implied in the insight when they generate 
rather than merely repeat it. Students might write quite similar arguments by the end of a shared lesson sequence 
and so it may look as if they hold the same knowledge; but what ultimately matters is whether they can each 
apply the necessary understanding independently and spontaneously. Teachers can only be sure that students’ 
background capacities have changed when the learning functions in the background position.  Given everything the 
class had shared in this sequence, I could not be sure that I was not just seeing foregrounded reasons rather than 
backgrounded reasoning. The measure of the background capacity generated through this sequence was not so 
much in this answer as in what the student would do spontaneously and independently in their next causal analysis
When insights are teacher-‘given’ rather than ‘arrived at’ by the pupil, the element of creativity is lost. 
Comprehension of another’s thinking is hugely valuable but it is not the same as the act of original generation. 
1
2
3
Figure 4: ‘What size circles?’ Diagram  illustrating 
different judgements about the relative importance 
of different factors
Economic Political ‘Hitler’
   Teaching History 161    December 2015    The Historical Association 41
the class because what each student says or writes is a token of 
a network of inferential bonds that are the culmination of their 
knowledge to date.  This gap matters to teachers because they 
have to help students both access and alter these underpinning 
inferential networks and that means understanding the partial 
and particular role that symbols, such as words, play.
implications of inferentialism 
for the history classroom
One crucial feature of these underlying inferential 
connections is that they typically ‘go without saying’; 
they are assumed norms which are taken for granted and 
allow our interactions to continue. Imagine, however, how 
sophisticated they must be within a knowledge domain such 
as history which is determined by substantive, second-order 
and procedural knowledge and relies on many unfamiliar, 
challenging and abstract concepts. Think how easy it is for 
teachers to mistake shared words for shared meaning in a 
context where students are routinely exposed to the same 
vocabulary and phrase patterns but where they integrate 
those ideas into their thinking in more or less sophisticated 
ways and with more or less engagement with the referents 
in the world to which those phrases apply. A pedagogical 
implication of Brandom’s inferentialism is that teachers 
need to get behind the veil of words and draw out the 
underpinning reasoning in a way that enables students 
to see and be held accountable for the commitments and 
entitlements implicit in what they say.
Teachers can easily misjudge the strength of students’ 
background capacities, not least because it requires binocular 
vision: one eye on the students’ underlying reasoning and 
one on the reasoning entailed in the intended learning. My 
Year 10 students heard the words in the question but their 
understanding of the historical reasoning that it required was 
largely missing. Their background capacities had led them to 
see substantive details as facts that could speak for themselves 
once selected. By implication, their concept of cause was one 
that entailed amassing details of what was occurring prior to 
the event being ‘explained’ and laying them out clearly on the 
page. They were not engaging with the economic, political, 
and ‘Hitler’ categories as devices to organise causal claims that 
could be of unequal influence. They interacted with the facts as 
if sorting coloured buttons into jars, with no conception that 
information was not simply there to be shuffled for content 
classification but rather to be interrogated for influence, 
interconnectivity and importance. 
I had ignored the strength of the underpinning inferential 
bonds through which my students made sense of the Venn 
diagram activity.  They were side-stepping the relevant 
thinking, not simply because I let them, but because my 
activity led them to do this, designed as it was on the basis 
of my assumption that the words in the question and the 
details on the cards meant to them what they meant to me.16 
I thought that fleeting inclusions of words like ‘cause’ and 
‘relative importance’ with a couple of probing questions – 
‘What do you think?’ and ‘Why do you think that?’ – would 
unlock the students’ thinking. 
In the often reciprocal relationship between teaching and 
learning, I simply got back from the students a reflection of 
what I originally gave to them. I had not engaged explicitly 
with their reasoning about the relative importance of these 
three causal categories and neither had they. In designing 
my lesson I had engaged with the thinking involved in 
sorting information into content categories, so that was all 
the students did. 
Another important issue is that teachers can struggle to teach for 
the depth of reasoning needed to make statements meaningful 
because they distort knowledge into its representational guise, 
severed from its inferentially determined meaning. This 
Figure 5: Diagram used to explain the ‘Why that size?’ boxes 
’Why that size?’ boxes
Hitler was less  important than Economic 
factors because he was skilful before the 
crisis but with little effect
Economic were more important than 
Political factors because political leaders 
squabbled over the economic crisis and 
their failure fed public discontent. 
Political factors were more important 
than Hitler because without the 
Hindenburg deal Hitler could not 
become Chancellor.
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Figure 6: Supporting questions designed to direct students towards the overlap cards
Supporting question
1. Both the economic crisis and Hitler’s own 
actions were important in his appointment as 
Chancellor but can you make a case for one 
being more important than the other? Use your 
Venn diagram. Which cards might help? (<, >)
2. Does it seem as if the political situation is 
changing because of the economic crisis or is 
the economic crisis changing because of the 
political situation? Which cards might help?
3. How could you argue that (a) Hitler’s actions 
outweighed the importance of the political 
situation in bringing about his appointment; 
or (b) vice versa; or (c) that both were equally 
important? Which cards might help? (>,<,=)
Example of student response and the card cited 
in support
E>H: Card 14: Nazi Party growth in electoral support from 
2.6% of the vote (seats) in 1928 to 37.3% of the vote 
(seats) in 1932
E>P: Card 8: Successive Chancellors from March 1930 to 
January 1933 failed to lead Germany out of economic 
crisis; AND Card 4: The Great Depression intensified 
feelings against the Weimar Republic and paved the way 
for the collapse of democracy.
P>H: Card 7: Hindenburg, under the influence of leading 
business and army figures, invited Hitler to become 
Chancellor and form a coalition government in January 
1933. It was hoped that Hitler could be harnessed to serve 
their needs.
distortion is worth thinking about a little further. Teachers 
have to pin concepts down in order to identify them clearly. 
Knowing exactly what it is they are teaching helps teachers 
work out how to teach it. But if they try to teach concepts as 
mere statements of fact they are unlikely to equip students 
with the understanding necessary to make them part of 
their background capacities. If I aspire for my students to 
understand the rise of Hitler through a ‘web-like’ rather than 
a ‘linear’ characterisation of causation my understanding of 
the operation of this second-order concept has been distilled 
from a multitude of reasoning encounters. An inferentialist 
perspective would caution against imagining that such 
terms as ‘linear’ and ‘web-like’ can be used as ‘reference-like’ 
statements – that simply need to be made clear, relevant and 
interesting, or to be exemplified as if they were ‘facts’ to be 
recited or applied. Such an approach will lead to disappointing 
results as soon as the outcome activities require something 
subtly, but significantly, different from what has been so neatly 
presented. The quality actually required (of good historians 
and by exam mark-schemes) is that students’ knowledge of 
causation as a ‘web’ should pervade their analysis.17  
This is an important but subtle idea: why is simply sharing 
the conceptual insight in its referential form and then 
getting the student to apply the idea so that the teacher 
can check their comprehension of it not enough to provide 
students with the rich inferential bonds they need behind 
their statements? Surely this not precisely what teaching is 
about – inducting students into society’s existing knowledge 
and ways of knowing?  In addressing this question, it is 
important to acknowledge that what we mean by ‘sharing’ 
and ‘comprehension’ deserves extended discussion and 
depends on our understanding of how students learn and 
of the distinct nature of knowledge domains (for example, 
how historical knowledge differs from knowledge of physics). 
Here, I would like to share just two ideas briefly. First, I 
suggest in Figure 3 a number of reasons why it could be 
advantageous to design learning sequences that build up to 
student discovery or revelation rather than relying solely 
on ‘give and check got’ approaches to teaching. Second, I 
recognise that while there may be a number of students 
whose learning is not hampered by a ‘give and check got’ type 
of instruction, such an approach risks distorting the process 
of knowledge acquisition for many others.  
As background capacities, concepts are tools; they exist, 
becoming what they are in use. Just as a hammer sitting on 
a bench remains a tool, but becomes a hammer in the fullest 
sense when it is engaged in hammering, implying a user and 
a purpose, so ‘causation as web-like’ is a headline, a referential 
statement. It is only as powerful or meaningful as its user’s 
background capacity; that is the student’s capacity to show 
how these and those events are related causally in this topic. 
Students’ ‘reasoning’ – in other words, what the student 
understands by their claims – potentially strengthens as it 
is flexed, fleshed out, tested and amended when the student 
brings it to bear upon the question in hand. It is forged 
over multiple and diverse encounters. The toddler needs to 
learn the word ‘kitten’ through sufficient encounters with 
‘kitten-like’ things in the world and in relation to relevant 
accompanying concepts so that their reasoning in relation 
to those encounters can give meaning to the word ‘kitten’. 
Likewise, if the student does not encounter sufficiently 
compelling experiences of causes operating within a web, and 
of the features associated with that kind of interplay, then there 
is little in their ‘space of reasons’ for these words to name. 
As teachers, we cannot be satisfied with the mere inclusion 
of ‘evaluative’ or ‘linking’ or ‘explaining’ sentences. If the 
meaning-making behind the original claim is weak, no 
amount of writing frames, model answers or question 
formulae intended to help students to replicate the 
appropriate material will satisfy the need to strengthen their 
underlying reasoning; that is, the students’ sense of what is 
ruled in and out and implied by the claim – what it is they 
think they are saying when they construct the sentence. 
The implication of adopting an inferentialist perspective 
is that student progress is seen to depend on a patient and 
deliberate building up and strengthening of knowledge 
through relevant reasoning about authentic encounters with 
the referents of particular words and not simply by providing 
the words themselves. 
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Figure 7: The cards used in the Venn diagram activity (Round 2) 
Von Papen (March 1932-November 1932) was driven 
out of office by a Reichstag vote of no confidence.
The 1st Weimar president, Ebert (1918-25) used Article 
48 sparingly with the aim of sustaining democracy. 
President Hindenburg (1925-34) used it frequently in a 
way that undermined the power of the Reichstag and 
democracy.
Germany had recovered from its first economic crisis 
(Hyperinflation 1923) largely thanks to American loans 
which dried up after the Wall Street Crash in October 
1929. 
Hitler didn’t just want to abolish the Treaty of Versailles. 
He explained in Mein Kampf how he sought to unite all 
German-speaking people (including Austrians) and not 
just to return Germany to her 1914 borders.
Hitler used his time in prison after the failed Munich 
Putsch to lay out a clear set of political ideas for the 
party in a book which he hoped would become a bible 
for his followers.
The Nationalists’ (DNVP) message was equally as 
nationalistic and hostile to the socialist threat as the 
Nazis. The Nazi party was never part of government in 
the Weimar period and could add a populist and anti-
establishment message.
The nature more than the number of political parties 
mattered as many were closely aligned with socio-
economic interest groups, for example, the Social 
Democrats (SPD) had mainly working class membership, 
and the People’s Party (DVP) was closely aligned with big 
business interests. The inability of parties to agree on 
the funding of unemployment relief caused the Grand 
Coalition to collapse in 1929-30.
The appointment of Hitler as Chancellor in January 1933 
was not due to overwhelming electoral support: 63% 
of the voters opposed Hitler. The highest percentage 
of votes ever won by the Nazis was 37.2% in July 
1932. When Hitler was given the job of Chancellor in a 
coalition government by President Hindenburg in 1933, 
Nazi support was actually slipping.
It was clear that Hindenburg did not want to appoint the 
upstart Nazi leader, refusing to make Hitler Chancellor in 
August 1932.
21 22
23 24
25 26
27 28
29 30
31 32
33 34
35 36
37 38
Schleicher (December 1932-January 1933), lasted 57 
days as Chancellor.
From March 1930 (Bruning) to January 1933 (Hitler), 
President Hindenburg used Article 48 to choose and 
keep Chancellors in power.
From 1919 to 1923 the Weimar Republic only survived  
being overthrown by extreme left- and right-wing 
parties because of the loyalty of the police and army.
The democratic system in Germany 1919-1933 did 
not have widespread support. The Nationalists (DNVP) 
looked back nostalgically to the semi-autocratic state of 
the imperial period, while the German Communist Party 
(KPD) sought a proletarian revolution.
Catholics tended to remain loyal to Catholic parties and 
factory workers (trade union members) remained loyal to 
left-wing parties.
Hitler used his time in prison after the failed Munich 
Putsch to transform the Nazi Party into a major national 
political party, which would compete for public votes 
in democratic elections. Their electoral professionalism 
enabled the Nazi message to reach parts of Germany 
that other parties did not reach. They also targeted 
specific interest groups with specific messages – trained 
speakers addressed local and concrete issues.
In 1929 the Nazi party and the Nationalists (DNVP) 
joined together to denounce re-negotiations of 
reparations and the resulting Young Plan. Hitler, the 
extremist fringe politician, was now seen centre stage 
with leading conservatives and given an unprecedented 
degree of respectability.
Bruning (Chancellor March 1930-March 1932) used 
President Hindenburg and Article 48 to introduce 
unpopular measures. Public spending cuts and tax 
increases made the economic crisis worse and President 
Hindenburg forced Chancellor Bruning to resign.
Between July and November 1932 the Nazis lost 2 
million votes.
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So how can teachers help students ‘get at’ the underlying 
referent reasoning – providing them with a sufficiently rich 
‘if…then…’ responsiveness to the referents in the world 
and not just with the words thought to represent them? In 
explaining how I revised my lesson sequence I share the 
ways in which I used symbols other than language and 
questioning to interrupt the students’ assumptions and 
engineer experiences of the relevant reasoning in response to 
referents rather than permit them to ‘sleep-walk’ through the 
kinds of activities which would make the necessary thinking 
too much of a hit-or-miss affair.
Revising the lesson sequence 
to enhance underlying 
responsiveness to the world
I needed my students to see that a claim about relative 
importance requires a process of judgment so I asked them to 
play with the size of the circles representing each factor on the 
Venn diagram. The circles could be presented as all of equal 
size, or as two equal circles with a larger or smaller one, or all as 
different sizes, as illustrated in Figure 4. The additional use of 
mathematical symbols and vocabulary – ‘more than’ (>), ‘less 
than’ (<), and ‘equal to’(=) – to express circle size combinations 
and variations was quite basic but nevertheless captured 
relative expressions (comparing one to another) rather than 
discrete characterisations of single factors. Students then 
turned these choices into thesis statements. 
Setting aside the issue of the quality of the students’ 
judgement process, what matters about this activity is 
that determining the circle size intrinsically requires an 
evaluation of relative importance. It is impossible to draw 
the circles without deciding on the relative importance of the 
causal factors that they each represent. The decision to be 
made is much more apparent than when writing sentences 
about the relative importance of the referents that the words 
are meant to convey. Drawing circles of a particular size 
temporarily lowers the literacy demands while increasing the 
likelihood of students entering the relevant ‘space of reasons’. 
While some students have little difficulty in holding on to 
the sentence referent, others all too readily manipulate the 
symbolic conventions that they have been given – within 
word mats or writing frames – without any commitment to 
the ideas the words are meant to symbolise. 
As students determined the size of their circles and compared 
their decisions to those of their neighbours, they invested 
in a tangible judgement visibly different from other valid 
possibilities. Seeing their decision in contrast to other students’ 
decisions opened the possibility of justification, defence and 
critique – a stance for one particular size configuration was a 
stance against other possible configurations. The assertion that 
‘the economic situation was the main reason Hitler became 
Chancellor’ became something contested, not something 
to memorise. I did not need to tell students that the relative 
importance of different causes was a matter of argument; 
they looked to their neighbours’ circle sizes and told me that 
the answer entailed disagreement. I helped them to name 
the learning they had arrived at for themselves. The words 
in the question now stood for something that students had 
experienced and manipulated first-hand. A slightly richer 
reasoning now lay behind their concept of cause. 
The task to determine the size of each circle had changed the 
possibility of what could be done with the information on the 
cards.  Students’ essays written at this point, however, reveal 
that while they were now confident in advancing a claim 
about relative importance, they tended to assert such claims 
rather than being able to argue for them.  Once again, I got 
back a reflection of what I had given.  I had invited judgement 
and that was what I got. But I had not engaged sufficiently 
with the justification of that judgement and neither had the 
students. Recognising that students’ underpinning inferential 
bonds were operating differently from mine signalled that 
something important remained unsaid and unseen.  I 
therefore introduced a further element – ‘Why that size?’ 
boxes, as shown in Figure 5, to help students see the need 
to justify their decisions.
Figure 8: Round 2 supporting questions designed to direct students towards the overlap cards
Supporting question
1. Why was the new state (Weimar 
Republic) able to survive inflation and 
not the Depression?
2. Why was the Nazi party in the 
political wilderness until the late 1920s?
3. Why did the Nationalists, who had 
similar policies to the Nazis, not gain 
more votes? 
4. Why did the Communists, who also 
offered a radical alternative to the 
Weimar Republic, not gain more votes? 
Card chosen by a student to justify their decision
Card 18: When the US stock market (called Wall Street) crashed 
in October 1929 the value of shares collapsed and many US 
businesses were ruined. Americans, suffering from the economic 
crisis, ended their loans to Germany and demanded the 
repayment of existing loans.
AND Card 26: Germany had recovered from its first economic 
crisis (Hyperinflation 1923) largely thanks to American loans 
which dried up after the Wall Street Crash in October 1929.
Card 14: Nazi Party growth in electoral support from 2.6% of 
the vote (seats) in 1928 to 37.3% of the vote (seats) in 1932.
Card 32: The Nationalists’ (DNVP) message was equally as 
nationalistic and hostile to the socialist threat as the Nazis. The 
Nazi party was never part of government in the Weimar period 
and could add a populist and anti-establishment message.
Card 1: The split between the Social Democrats (SPD) and the 
Communists (KDP) meant that they spent time attacking each 
other rather than uniting against the Right in the early 1930s.
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A clearly-defined space (an empty box) on the information 
capture sheets compelled the students to record their ideas 
about why they had reached their decisions about the relative 
importance of the three factors. Again these boxes gave physical 
form to the thinking required: (a) we need reasons; and (b) 
they need to be reasons for the relative importance of the 
three kinds of factor; not reasons for content classification, nor 
even reasons as relationships between a particular factor and a 
specific event, but rather reasons why this causal factor is more, 
less, or just as important in causing Hitler’s appointment as that 
one. The physical space of these boxes encouraged pupils to see 
not just what was needed and how these arguments differed 
from the ‘raw’ information contained on the cards, but also to 
recognise when they did not have any reason for that claim or 
when they could not adequately express the reasons that they 
felt intuitively.  As teachers, establishing precisely what needs 
to be done by our students but cannot yet be done is useful; 
even more so, if it can be established through a relatively simple 
preparatory task rather than more extensive written work. It 
enables the teacher to think carefully about what to foreground 
next in their teaching and how. 
Even after these activities, some students were still struggling 
to generate arguments as to why this or that factor was more 
or less important. Both of my sequence adaptations (the 
circle and box exercises) clarified the student ‘destination’ 
– to judge and justify – but they said nothing about student 
‘route’. It was as if some of my students were saying, ‘I know I 
need to do it, but how do I set about judging and justifying?’ 
They were still being asked to perform much too early; their 
boxes were sparsely populated and their essays were being 
‘improved’ not by their greater causal reasoning but by their 
neighbours’ arguments. I had not engaged with how to arrive 
at a claim for the relative importance of different factors and 
neither had many of them.
The route lay in helping them to understand how the Venn 
diagram functioned and why I had structured the task in 
that particular way. Some of them had still not recognised 
the significance of the overlap spaces on the Venn diagram; 
they did not realise that if they could establish how one 
category or factor impinged upon another they could use 
their knowledge of this influence to help them assess the 
relative importance of one in relation to the other. For 
me, this was self-evident: it ‘went without saying’ because 
somewhere in my background capacities I had realised that 
I could assess relative importance on the basis of the links 
between causal factors. The ‘no-brainer’ quality of some 
knowledge is peculiar to the knower, however, and teachers 
must be cautious about simply ‘giving’ students the referential 
fact devoid of the relevant reasoning. Telling is not always 
teaching. I wanted to help students to arrive at this insight for 
themselves.  I realised that if students were not ready to tell 
me the significance of the cards in the overlap categories, they 
were in danger of having more referential ‘rules of thumb’, 
statements to remember, but still lacking the corresponding 
background capacities that would make those rules helpful. 
I therefore tried to engineer student discovery of the role that 
overlap cards could play by using supporting questions, such 
as those listed in Figure 6, to focus their attention on the 
particular cards within the Venn diagram that had helped 
them to generate arguments about relative importance.  
For some students this was enough. They benefited from 
narrowing the focus on to a single combination of factors and 
moving methodically from one factor combination to the next, 
Figure 9: An example of the explanations written by one student to explain her decisions about the 
size of each circle in Round 2
’Why that size?’ boxes
Hitler gains support from below (public vote) 
and above (Hindenburg deal and fear of 
Communism). He could not have secured 
these essentials without the economic crisis.
The lack of political agreement has an 
economic root and the policies enforced 
through Art. 48 are problematic because 
they are making the economy worse, not 
because they are being decreed.
Structural features help Hitler – proportional 
representation gives small parties platforms 
and makes majorities difficult; also a divided 
Left (even had Left united, the Right still held 
elite positions and Presidency) 
The most important 
single factor bringing 
the other two into play 
Political structure 
provides context and 
individual political 
leaders opportunity but 
in response to economic 
crisis – a necessary 
contributing factor
Essential and 
skilful but 
insufficient 
without 
opportunity 
Teaching History 161    December 2015    The Historical Association46    
others still did not recognise the significance of the overlap 
cards at the end of this third adaptation (the use of supporting 
questions). I could have given them that insight and hoped for 
student comprehension and use but I was reluctant to do so. 
As I redeveloped my teaching of this topic in subsequent years, 
I decided instead to break the material down, presenting it in 
two ‘layers’. On the first occasion, I provided a relatively simple 
set of cards with limited information. After completing the 
sequence of tasks with that information, my students tackled 
the whole process again with the addition of a more complex 
set of cards for Round 2 (shown in Figure 7). This gave them a 
second chance to see the destination and route for themselves 
and improve their judgements and justifications by repeating 
the cycle of Venn diagram, circle size, argument boxes and 
supporting questions with reference on the second occasion 
to the full range of cards. The second layering of information 
and activities gave all students a chance to engage with richer 
substantive detail when they were already feeling confident 
about the nature of the task and had invested in it. Those that 
had begun to grasp the role that the ‘overlap cards’ play in 
generating reasoning about relative importance were primed 
to make such connections as they sorted the second set of 
cards, adding them to their existing Venn diagram. Students 
used their deepening knowledge of the material, destination 
and route, to amend or complete new versions of their ‘What 
size circles?’ and ‘Why that size?’ boxes. Figure 8 sets out the 
supporting questions from Round 2 designed to give them one 
last chance to see the role of the overlap cards for themselves.
The second run through the activities proved extremely 
powerful, as Figure 9 demonstrates. I learned that students 
benefited far more from this layering than if they had 
engaged in these activities once each in relation to two 
different topics, such as Hitler becoming Chancellor and then 
Hitler becoming dictator. I believe that deep engagement on 
one occasion, rather than more a more superficial approach 
for two separate questions, yielded better learning because 
the nuance of students’ argument rests on the quality 
of their substantive knowledge, their investment in the 
referents and corresponding arguments, and the confidence 
they have developed in themselves and their capacities. 
In my experience, students could translate their deeper 
understanding of one question into their thinking about 
alternative questions and subsequent topics. Knowing that 
I was going to revisit the question, providing a second layer 
of information, also helped me to resist the temptation to 
circumvent their thinking process and give away insights 
before the students were ready. (I will acknowledge, however, 
that by the end of the second round I was happy to give 
everything away, hoping that the groundwork I had laid 
would support students’ understanding of the principles that 
those statements embodied.) 
How can we protect student 
meaning-making in our 
lessons?
I have suggested that the strength of students’ inferential 
bonds can be difficult to access and that teachers can easily 
struggle to teach for underlying reasoning. There are, 
however, a number of ways in which teachers can avoid their 
lessons deteriorating into the amalgamation of vast quantities 
of information about the past or endless engagement in 
uninformed reasoning and writing tasks that get students 
running on a treadmill of activity that only exercises their 
existing background capacities rather than developing them 
further.
1. By giving careful thought to what we 
mean by knowledge 
We need to recognise the potential gap between the 
manifestation of knowledge and the strength of the student 
reasoning or meaning-making that sits behind the claims 
advanced. It is helpful to remember that what words are 
meant to symbolise matters just as much, if not more, 
than the symbols themselves; that words cannot symbolise 
everything; and that words are not our only symbols. 
2. By thinking carefully about who is doing 
the thinking
By structuring lesson planning and evaluation around 
questions such as, ‘Who is doing the thinking in this 
activity?’; ‘What thinking is it and with what material and 
support?’; ‘For what end or purpose?’; and ‘How does this 
fit into the broader programme of learning?’ The third is by 
understanding that, when designing activities, any activity 
will not do and, of course, the same could be said of factual 
content. Teachers need to be precise about the relevant 
‘space of reasons’ for the intended learning – relevant to the 
students’ start-point and to the historical problem posed. 
Through teacher experimentation and careful observation 
(or ‘field-notes’ – the term I encourage student-teachers to 
apply to their lesson plans and evaluations), we can begin 
to understand what it means to control a number of aspects 
of the lesson which require sophisticated decisions about 
where to direct students’ attention, when and how long to 
have it linger on particular points. If we are not getting the 
knowledge manifestations we want, the reason may be that 
we are simply getting back a reflection of what we have given. 
3. By experimenting with making the target 
knowledge more or less explicit
We create opportunities for cognitive labour through our 
choice of what we ask students to think about (and with 
what support and for what purpose). While it may seem 
counter-intuitive to make the target more obscure on 
occasion, strategic choices about when to focus the cognitive 
labour on self-discovery rather than on merely grasping 
other peoples’ insights depend on teacher purpose. I use 
the continuum shown in Figure 10 to help me to articulate 
one way to think about teaching. For example, the visual 
nature of my circles and boxes deliberately makes the point 
of the question very obvious. On this occasion I did not want 
students to invest their cognitive labour in working out the 
focus of the question – what exactly it was asking (though 
on other occasions I would need to be sure that they could 
do that for themselves). I had also chosen in this lesson 
sequence to make the relevant substantive knowledge easily 
available through my choice of the information provided on 
the cards and to make the links between different factors 
quite obvious by creating cards on which two or more factors 
were already combined. Having said that, I made students 
work hard for the arguments supporting their judgements 
about relative importance and I made the significance of the 
overlap cards very obscure at the beginning to maximise 
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students’ opportunities to arrive at the insight for themselves, 
gradually making it more obvious until I finally gave it away 
as an object for comprehension. 
In sharing this continuum, however, I want to refute the 
simplistic assumption that ‘arriving at’ is good and ‘given’ 
is bad; that one characterises learning that is active while 
the other is necessarily passive; or that this particular 
characteristic is defined at the task level. For example, 
depending upon exactly how the tasks are orchestrated, 
card-sorts can be a way of providing either knowledge that 
is ‘given’ or knowledge that is ‘arrived at’. The same is true 
of individual reading. I would suggest that lessons need to 
balance ‘telling’ with precisely-designed opportunities for 
student discovery. We ‘give and check’ (that students have 
‘got’ it) for some aspects of the lesson and we ‘have pupils 
arrive at’ for others. Knowing which to do when, for whom, 
and why is central to teacher expertise. 
Including an inferential perspective in our understanding 
of meaning could support our thinking about historical 
knowledge. The suggestion that a simple act of naming 
involves reasoning encourages us to re-think how we often 
separate ‘knowing’ (sometimes labelled as comprehension 
or description) from ‘higher-order’ reasoning such as 
explaining or evaluating.18 Thinking of reasoning as an 
integral component of every and any claim or utterance 
might help sharpen our clarity as to whether we are 
discussing the act of knowing – what it means to know, what 
kind of a thing knowing is –  or the type of thing that we know 
about – knowledge related to procedural concepts, second-
order concepts, substantive knowledge. This perspective also 
helps us see variation in the outward performance of various 
students as a manifestation of their varying inward ‘space 
of reasons’ and that this space is where symbols get their 
meaning, from first-hand relevant reasoning in response to 
referent recognition.19 
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